当晋升是信号时的劳动力市场配额

Labor Market Quotas When Promotions Are Signals

Journal of Labor Economics · 2020
被引 9
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

研究了劳动力市场配额如何通过制造晋升原因的不确定性,引发赢家诅咒,降低对高层女性的竞争,从而扩大性别工资差距,并探讨了配额对雇主了解女性能力激励的影响。

Abstract

We analyze the consequences of labor market quotas for the wages of women in high-level positions. Labor market quotas create uncertainty about the reason a woman is promoted. Firms know whether they promoted female employees because of the quota or their ability; their competitors do not. A winner’s curse, reducing competition for women in high-level positions, results. This widens the gender pay gap for these women. Ex ante, women are better off without quotas. Next we investigate how quotas affect incentives for employers to learn women’s abilities to make better job assignment decisions. Then, under specific conditions women may benefit.

劳动力市场配额晋升信号性别工资差距赢家诅咒