The Impact of Contract Enforcement Costs on Value Chains and Aggregate Productivity
研究了供应商合同摩擦如何影响中间投入品使用模式，并量化了这些扭曲对总生产率的影响。发现法律执行成本高的国家，在诉讼频繁的行业对中，企业中间投入支出份额较低。改进合同执行制度可带来显著福利收益。
Abstract I study how supplier contracting frictions shape the patterns of intermediate input use and quantify the impact of these distortions on aggregate productivity. Using the frequency of litigation between US firms as a novel measure to capture the need for formal enforcement, I find a robust relationship between countries' input-output structure and their quality of legal institutions. In countries with high enforcement costs, firms have lower expenditure shares on intermediate inputs in sector pairs where US firms litigate frequently for breach of contract. A quantitative model shows that improvement of contract enforcement institutions would lead to sizable welfare gains.