Emission Regulation of Markets with Sluggish Supply Structures
研究了在投资成本凸性和技术特定产能存量下，排放税对当前和未来排放的影响，发现未来减排需立即行动，且当私人贴现率与社会贴现率不同时，需结合投资税或补贴才能实现社会最优路径。
Abstract I examine regulation in the presence of convex investment costs and technology specific capacity stocks. Announcement of future emission taxes reduces current emissions unless fossil fuels are scarce, in which case the effect is ambiguous. Substantial future emission reductions require action today, because it takes time to build up clean production capacity and phase out dirty capacity. The Pigou tax must be coupled with sector specific investment taxes or subsidies to induce the socially optimal trajectory if the private discount rate differs from the social discount rate. If such investment taxes or subsidies are unavailable, a (time-inconsistent) second-best alternative may be to tax emissions above the Pigouvian level during the transition phase. The theory is complemented with a stylized numerical model of the US electricity market.