Cartel stability in experimental first-price sealed-bid and English auctions
通过实验室实验，比较了异质价值环境下第一价格密封投标拍卖和英式拍卖中投标环的稳定性，发现英式拍卖中卡特尔更稳定，但第一价格密封投标拍卖在平均收入和收入分布上更优，而英式拍卖效率更高。
Using laboratory experiments, we compare the stability of bidding rings in the first-price sealed-bid auction and the English auction in a heterogeneous-value setting. In both a re-matching condition and a fixed-matching condition, we observe that bidding rings are more stable in the English auction than in the first-price sealed-bid auction. In both conditions, the first-price sealed-bid auction dominates the English auction in terms of average revenue and the revenue spread. The English auction outperforms the first-price sealed-bid auction in terms of efficiency.