Projection of Private Values in Auctions
研究了品味投射（高估他人品味与自己相似的程度）如何影响拍卖中的出价行为，发现投射导致过度出价、降低最优保留价，并在共同价值成分下降低第二价格和英式拍卖的配置效率。
We explore how taste projection—the tendency to overestimate how similar others’ tastes are to one’s own—affects bidding in auctions. In first-price auctions with private values, taste projection leads bidders to exaggerate the intensity of competition and, consequently, to overbid—irrespective of whether values are independent, affiliated, or (a)symmetric. Moreover, the optimal reserve price is lower than the rational benchmark, and decreasing in the extent of projection and the number of bidders. With an uncertain common-value component, projecting bidders draw distorted inferences about others’ information. This misinference is stronger in second-price and English auctions, reducing their allocative efficiency compared to first-price auctions.