Industry tournament incentives and stock price crash risk
研究发现，CEO在经理人劳动市场锦标赛中晋升的激励越强，其所在公司的股价崩盘风险越大，因为这类高管更倾向于隐瞒负面信息。
Abstract Theoretical and empirical studies argue that managerial hoarding of negative firm‐specific information can result in large negative stock price corrections once the accumulated information is revealed. A managerial labor market with tournament‐like progression provides managers with the incentive to withhold negative information. We find that chief executive officers with stronger incentives to progress in the managerial labor market tournament have significantly greater stock price crash risk, consistent with a greater propensity for these executives to withhold negative firm‐specific information. The empirical patterns that we document suggest a negative externality to the positive incentive effects provided by the managerial labor market.