IRREVERSIBILITY AND MONITORING IN DYNAMIC GAMES: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
通过实验室实验，研究了不可逆性和不完全监控如何分别通过不同渠道降低重复公共品博弈的效率和公平性，并利用有限混合模型解释了处理效应。
Abstract This article provides experimental evidence on the impacts of irreversibility and imperfect monitoring on the efficiency and the equity of a repeated public goods game. We find that irreversibility and imperfect monitoring both lead to inefficient and unequal outcomes through different channels. Irreversibility lowers public goods contribution in earlier periods and makes the initial‐period contribution gap between two players long‐lasting. Imperfect monitoring hampers conditional cooperation and persistently reduces group contribution. A finite mixture estimation with conditional cooperators provides a coherent account of the treatment effects.