From Inefficient Behind-the-Border Policies to Inefficient Trade Agreements: A Two-Tier Asymmetric Information Model
构建了一个包含两层信息不对称的一般均衡贸易模型，分析国内低效生产者的政治影响如何导致低效的境内政策，进而阻碍贸易协定实现自由贸易。
Abstract We consider a general equilibrium model of international trade with two layers of informational asymmetries. Private information of Home producers on costs affects the design of ‘behind-the-border’ policies reflecting the political influence of inefficient producers. Home's supply is contracted, causing trade, and motivating the use of tariffs. Eliminating those instruments by means of a trade agreement may become impossible once Home has also private information on its redistributive concerns. Home, when subject to strong influence by inefficient producers, might be reluctant to adopt free trade, which may lead to limited tariff cuts and give a role for export subsidies.