Stock pledging and firm risk: Evidence from India
研究了印度公司大股东（发起人）质押个人持股对股票波动、资本投资决策和企业绩效的影响，发现高比例质押会加剧股价波动、促使低风险投资、损害企业价值并阻碍长期业绩。
Abstract Pledging of personally held common stock is widespread in India, where pledging often serves as lender collateral for large shareholder and promoter personal debt acquisitions. This practice is exacerbated by high ownership concentrations in India, as promoters, often firm founders, control, on average, 51% of their firms’ equity. We examine promoter stock pledging impacts on stock volatility, capital investment decisions, and firm performance, using a sample of 1,452 Indian firms. We find that pledging relatively large proportions of outstanding shares and substantial proportions of shares held by promoters exacerbates stock volatility, fosters lower risk capital investments, adversely affects firm values, and impedes longer‐term performance.