Robust predictions in dynamic policy games
研究了动态政策博弈中多种均衡下的稳健预测方法，以主权债务模型为例，刻画了在给定历史条件下与子博弈完美均衡一致的结果分布，并计算了危机概率的上下界。
Dynamic policy games feature a wide range of equilibria. This paper provides a methodology for obtaining robust predictions. We focus on a model of sovereign debt, although our methodology applies to other settings, such as models of monetary policy or capital taxation. Our main result is a characterization of distributions over outcomes that are consistent with a subgame perfect equilibrium conditional on the observed history. We illustrate our main result by computing—conditional on an observed history—bounds across all equilibria on the maximum probability of a crisis: means, variances, and covariances over debt prices.