Searching Forever After
研究了一个双方搜寻模型，其中代理人的策略推理是粗糙的。均衡中，最理想的代理人行为完全理性，而其他代理人因粗糙推理对市场前景过度乐观，导致搜寻时间过长；部分中间匹配值的代理人可能永远搜寻，而其他人最终结婚。随着搜寻摩擦消失，永久单身比例单调趋近于1，表明搜寻技术改进可能适得其反，甚至导致市场失败。
We study a model of two-sided search in which agents’ strategic reasoning is coarse. In equilibrium, the most desirable agents behave as if they were fully rational, while for all other agents, coarse reasoning results in overoptimism with regard to their prospects in the market. Consequently, they search longer than is optimal. Moreover, agents with intermediate match values may search indefinitely while all other agents eventually marry. We show that the share of eternal singles converges monotonically to one as search frictions vanish. Thus, improvements in search technology may backfire and even lead to market failure.