Managerial Learning from Analyst Feedback to Voluntary Capex Guidance, Investment Efficiency, and Firm Performance
研究发现管理者发布自愿资本支出指引后，会从分析师的反馈中学习，进而调整投资，提升投资效率和公司业绩。
We test predictions that managers issuing voluntary capex guidance learn from analyst feedback and that this learning enhances investment efficiency and firm performance. Our findings are consistent with these predictions. First, we find that managers’ capex adjustments and capex guidance revisions relate positively with analyst feedback measured by differences between postguidance analyst capex forecasts and managerial capex guidance. Second, changes in investment efficiency relate positively with analyst feedback. Third, subsequent firm financial performance relates positively with the predicted values of both managers’ capex adjustments and capex guidance revisions. These findings extend prior evidence regarding sources of managerial learning and investment efficiency and help to explain the active issuance of voluntary guidance by managers in settings where, as for capex guidance, the potential for managerial learning from related share price effects is limited, as we also explain. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting.