Who Writes the News? Corporate Press Releases during Merger Negotiations
研究发现，在并购谈判开始后、公开宣布前，股票收购方会主动发布更多新闻稿，以短期推高自身股价，从而影响换股比例和收购价格。
ABSTRACT Firms have an incentive to manage media coverage to influence their stock prices during important corporate events. Using comprehensive data on media coverage and merger negotiations, we find that bidders in stock mergers originate substantially more news stories after the start of merger negotiations, but before the public announcement. This strategy generates a short‐lived run‐up in bidders' stock prices during the period when the stock exchange ratio is determined, which substantially impacts the takeover price. Our results demonstrate that the timing and content of financial media coverage may be biased by firms seeking to manipulate their stock price.