Do firms lease to hedge? CEO risk‐taking and operating lease intensity
研究了CEO风险承担激励与企业经营租赁使用之间的关系，发现更高的风险承担激励会降低经营租赁强度，表明企业利用租赁进行对冲。
Abstract Operating leases are used extensively for financing, but their ability to separate ownership and use also creates hedging opportunities. We investigate whether firms recognize such opportunities by examining the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) risk‐taking incentives and the use of operating leases. Consistent with firms using operating leases to hedge, we find higher CEO risk‐taking incentives lower operating lease intensity. To address endogeneity, we use the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 123R as an exogenous shock to option compensation, dynamic panel generalized method of moments, simultaneous equations, and change regressions. Our results are robust to placebo and alternative tests.