The benefits and perils of job candidates’ signaling their morality in selection decisions
研究发现，求职者的道德信号并非总是有利：在道德有污点的行业，发送道德信号的候选人反而更不被录用，原因是感知到的岗位匹配度低；但组织采用道德框架可消除这一负面效应。
Abstract In this research, we challenge the belief that positive signals of morality always increase job candidates’ appeal to interviewers. In four experiments with both experienced and novice interviewers, we find that signals of the candidates’ morality interact with the nature of the industry such that candidates who send signals of morality are less likely to be selected for jobs in a morally tainted industry, compared to neutral candidates. Moderated mediation analyses indicate that this effect is driven by a perceived lack of job fit (Experiments 1 and 2). Results of Experiment 3 indicate that this moderation effect is limited to candidates who signal morality—candidates applying for jobs in morally tainted industries who signal immorality do not enjoy a competitive advantage over moral or morally neutral candidates. Finally, the framing of the organization, that is, whether critical aspects of the organization are presented as more morally or economically oriented, within morally tainted industries helps mitigate the penalizing effects interviewers put on candidates who signal their morality—a moral frame eliminates this negative effect whereas an economic frame does not (Experiment 4). Together, these studies indicate that a job candidate's morality is a complicated and important quality that can profoundly affect his/her ratings of hireability.