Strategic behavior by market intermediaries
研究发现，电影和电子游戏评论机构会推迟发布对营销力度大的产品的负面评价，并刻意与竞争对手的评分拉开差距，以平衡来自产品供应商和竞争者的压力。
Abstract Research summary We explore how information intermediaries preserve relationships with firms they cover and differentiate from competitors while also maintaining legitimacy with their audiences. We find that intermediaries evaluating movies and video games delay disclosing more negative reviews of heavily marketed products so that they do not coincide with the major product marketing push. We also find that media organizations artificially differentiate themselves from their competitors. We demonstrate that critics are more deviant when they can observe another's opinion and that differentiation increases when they tend to evaluate the same types of products. Our interpretation is that information intermediaries do not simply provide objective reviews, but instead appear strategic in balancing pressures from product “suppliers” and competitors as they compete for the attention of their audiences. Managerial summary We argue that film and video game reviews by professional media outlets reflect two types of strategic behavior. First, intermediaries evaluating movies and video games delay disclosing more negative reviews of heavily marketed products. Second, critics artificially deviate their review scores from those of close competitors. We conclude that information intermediaries do not simply provide objective reviews, but instead appear strategic in balancing pressures from product “suppliers” and competitors as they compete for the attention of their audiences.