Is an M&A self‐dealing? Evidence on international and domestic acquisitions and CEO compensation
研究了1995至2016年美国公司国际与国内收购对CEO薪酬的影响，发现收购后CEO薪酬（尤其是激励薪酬）增长更多，支持代理理论，且国际收购比国内收购带来的激励薪酬增长更大。
Abstract We examine the effect of international acquisitions on CEO compensation for US firms from 1995 to 2016 using both domestic acquisition and no acquisition firms as benchmarks. We find that acquisitions lead to a greater increase in CEO compensation (especially incentive‐based compensation), which is consistent with agency theory and inconsistent with stewardship or reputation theory. We also find that international acquisitions lead to a greater increase in CEO incentive‐based compensation than domestic acquisitions, supporting matching theory given that international acquisitions are larger and more complex to manage. Additionally, we document that CEO tenure has a positive effect on CEO compensation, whereas firm relatedness has a negative effect on post‐acquisition CEO compensation. This is the first study of its type based on comprehensive data, and it contributes to our understanding of the role of international and domestic acquisitions in CEO compensation.