Monitor Reputation and Transparency
研究监管者如何设计信息披露政策来影响监督者的声誉激励，发现最优政策是保持监督者声誉处于中间水平，而非完全透明，随机延迟或噪声信息更有效。
We study the disclosure policy of a regulator overseeing a monitor with reputation concerns. The monitor faces a manager, who chooses how much to manipulate based on the monitor’s reputation. Reputational incentives are strongest for intermediate reputations. Instead of providing transparency, the regulator’s disclosure policy aims to keep the monitor’s reputation intermediate, even at the cost of diminished incentives. Beneficial schemes feature random delay or noisy information. Schemes that feature verifiable disclosure destroy reputational incentives. The regulator discloses more aggressively when she has better enforcement tools.