To Trade, or not to Trade, that is the Question: New Roles for Incomplete Contracts in Dynamic Settings
在动态再谈判模型中重新审视不完全合同的作用，发现当交易机会持久时，加剧绝对套牢脆弱性的合同（如联合所有权、排他性协议）反而更优，挑战了静态模型的结论。
Abstract We reexamine the role of incomplete contracts in a dynamic model of renegotiation that endogenizes the timing of investments and trade. The interaction between bargaining and investment significantly alters the lessons learned from static models. When the opportunity to trade is expected to be long lasting, contracts that exacerbate the parties’ absolute vulnerability to hold-up—especially following under-investment—are desirable. For example, joint ownership of complementary assets can be optimal, an exclusivity agreement can protect the investments of its recipient, and trade contracts can facilitate purely cooperative investment.