Insider trading in rumored takeover targets
研究了美国上市公司在收购传闻首次发布前一年内，内部人净买入增加的现象，发现准确或信息丰富的传闻前内幕交易更显著，且异常内幕交易能预测后续收购公告。
Abstract We examine insider trading surrounding takeover rumors in a sample of 1,642 publicly traded US firms. Using difference‐in‐differences regressions, we find that insider net purchases increase within the year prior to the first publication of a takeover rumor, particularly when rumor articles are either accurate (lead to a takeover announcement) or informative (provide substantial justification for the rumor's publication). Moreover, we find abnormal insider trading to be a significant predictor of takeover announcements occurring within the following year. Finally, passive net purchasing (i.e., selling less rather than buying more) is more pronounced among managing insiders than among non‐managing insiders.