Playing the field in all-pay auctions
首次用连续时间协议研究全支付拍卖，发现参与者出价低于纳什均衡，且演化模型能预测不同竞拍人数下的收敛或周期行为，对拍卖设计有参考价值。
Abstract We provide the first examination of all-pay auctions using continuous-time protocols, allowing subjects to adjust their bid at will, observe payoffs almost instantaneously, and gain more experience through repeated-play than in previous, discrete-time, implementations. Unlike our predecessors—who generally find overbidding—we observe underbidding relative to Nash equilibrium. To test the predictions of evolutionary models, we vary the number of bidders and prizes across treatments. If two bidders compete for a single prize, evolutionary models predict convergence to equilibrium. If three bidders compete for two prizes, evolutionary models predict non-convergent cyclical behavior. Consistent with evolutionary predictions, we observe cyclical behavior in both auctions and greater instability in two-prize auctions. These results suggest that evolutionary models can provide practitioners in the field with additional information about long-run aggregate behavior that is absent from conventional models.