Financial Incentives for the Development of Blockchain‐Based Platforms
构建理论模型，分析企业家在何种条件下偏好创建使用加密代币的去中心化数字平台而非传统平台，并研究平台开发中的效率问题，包括外部融资导致的多种均衡结果。
ABSTRACT I develop a theoretical model showing that an entrepreneur prefers to create a decentralized digital platform with a crypto‐token as its internal currency (rather than a traditional platform) when the total surplus from trade is low relative to the dollar value of transactions. I then study inefficiencies in the development of such platforms. When external funding is not required, effort may be above or below its efficient level. When external funding is required, multiple Pareto‐ranked equilibria arise: in each, with strictly positive probability, the entrepreneur liquidates his tokens and halts development.