Deterring collusion with a reserve price: an auction experiment
通过实验比较了有保留价和无保留价的一级价格密封拍卖中的合谋行为，发现保留价能显著降低贿赂金额和成功率，但会降低效率，将剩余从竞拍者转移给卖家。
Abstract We experimentally compare collusive behaviors in first-price sealed-bid auctions without and with a reserve price. Before the auction begins, a bidder may offer a bribe to the other bidder, in exchange for a commitment not to participate in the auction. We find that the average offer and the rate of successful bribes are significantly lower in the treatment with a reserve price. These results are largely due to responding bidders who demand a greater share of the benefit from collusion. Although imposing a reserve price reduces efficiency, its optimality and bribe deterrence shift the surplus from the bidders to the seller.