Fiscal Rules Cause Lower Debt: Evidence from Switzerland’s Federal Debt Containment Rule
用合成控制法研究瑞士2003年联邦债务控制规则的效果，发现该规则使公共债务比率平均降低2.5个百分点，且未导致债务转移或投资削减，其成功归因于规则设计特征和直接民主授权。
SUMMARY This paper studies the effect of the Swiss federal debt containment rule on public debt. Using the synthetic control method, we provide evidence that the introduction of the federal rule in 2003 has reduced public debt ratio in Switzerland by 2.5 percentage points on average until 2010. By exploiting possible mechanisms, we find no evidence that the reduction in debt ratio was driven by a debt relocation to sub‐government levels or cutbacks in investment expenditure. On one hand, we argue that the positive impact of the fiscal rule is based on its design features, namely its precise but cyclically adjusted target, the comprehensive scope to prevent budget loopholes, and the strict sanction mechanism. On the other hand, we also discuss the generalizability of our findings to other countries and contend that its direct democratic authorization has contributed to its political enforcement and viability.