The Economics of Deferral and Clawback Requirements
研究了金融业强制延期支付和追回条款对高管激励合同的影响，发现适度要求仅在经理外部选择权高时有效，严格规定会适得其反，并探讨了其与资本监管的最优政策组合。
ABSTRACT We analyze the effects of regulatory interference in compensation contracts, focusing on recent mandatory deferral and clawback requirements restricting incentive compensation of material risk‐takers in the financial sector. Moderate deferral requirements have a robustly positive effect on risk‐management effort only if the bank manager's outside option is sufficiently high; otherwise, their effectiveness depends on the dynamics of information arrival. Stringent deferral requirements unambiguously backfire. Our normative analysis characterizes whether and how deferral and clawback requirements should supplement capital regulation as part of the optimal policy mix.