The Revelation Principle in Multistage Games
研究了多阶段博弈中通信显示原理是否成立，发现对序贯均衡一般不成立，但在纯逆向选择、纯道德风险等特定博弈类中成立，并给出了序贯均衡可实施性的等价条件。
Abstract The communication revelation principle (RP) of mechanism design states that any outcome that can be implemented using any communication system can also be implemented by an incentive-compatible direct mechanism. In multistage games, we show that in general the communication RP fails for the solution concept of sequential equilibrium (SE). However, it holds in important classes of games, including single-agent games, games with pure adverse selection, games with pure moral hazard, and a class of social learning games. For general multistage games, we establish that an outcome is implementable in SE if and only if it is implementable in a canonical Nash equilibrium in which players never take codominated actions. We also prove that the communication RP holds for the more permissive solution concept of conditional probability perfect Bayesian equilibrium.