Debt and Voluntary Disclosure
研究了债务和股权融资公司的经理人基于股权和公司价值市场价格组合的薪酬合同如何影响自愿披露水平，发现债务增加对披露的影响取决于薪酬合同类型。
ABSTRACT This paper studies equilibrium voluntary disclosures for a company financed with both debt and equity, where the firm's manager is compensated based on a linear combination of the market prices of the firm's equity and enterprise values (i.e., the sum of its values of equity and debt). Such compensation policies span “all equity” contracts, “all debt” contracts, and “all enterprise value” contracts. We show: (1) under both “all equity” and “all debt” contracts, increased debt always leads to reduced voluntary disclosure; (2) under “all enterprise value” contracts, increased debt has no effect on voluntary disclosure; (3) for all contracts that place positive weight on both equity and enterprise values, more debt leads to less (respectively, more) disclosure if the initial debt level is low (respectively, high); (4) increasing the weight on equity prices always induces less disclosure, so: (5) “all equity” contracts minimize disclosures, and “all debt” contracts maximize disclosures.