Does Evaluation Change Teacher Effort and Performance? Quasi-experimental Evidence from a Policy of Retesting Students
研究发现，一项短期教师评估规则（学生不及格后重考，取高分计入教师评分）导致教师对重考学生投入更多努力，一年后这些学生成绩仍高出0.03个标准差，表明评估激励对教师行为有持久影响。
Abstract We document measurable, lasting gains in student achievement caused by a change in teachers' evaluation incentives. A short-lived rule created a discontinuity in teachers' incentives when allocating effort across their assigned students: students who failed an initial end-of-year test were retested a few weeks later, and then only the higher of the two scores was used when calculating the teacher's evaluation score. One year later, long after the discontinuity in incentives had ended, retested students scored 0.03σ higher than nonretested students. Otherwise identical students were treated differently by teachers because of evaluation incentives, despite arguably equal returns to teacher effort.