Optimal contract for asset trades: Collateralizing or selling?
研究了资产是出售还是用作抵押的条件，发现担保贷款能减少贷方获取信息的动机，且在借款方可能伪造资产质量时，过度抵押的担保贷款更优，但战略违约可能使出售更优。
I study the conditions under which assets are sold or used as collateral. Secured loans can be optimal by reducing the lender's incentives to acquire costly information about the future value of collateral assets. Furthermore, when the borrower has incentives to falsify the assets' quality, the assets cannot be sold but can be used as collateral via over-collateralization, and secured loans are optimal. However, under secured debts, the borrower may default strategically. Thus, an asset sale can be optimal under some conditions. In the paper, I also provide a theoretic explanation for the negative correlations between interest rates and haircuts.