Fake News, Voter Overconfidence, and the Quality of Democratic Choice
通过理论和实验研究过度自信与假新闻如何共同损害信息汇总和民主决策质量，发现过度自信在集体层面的负面影响远大于个人层面。
This paper studies, theoretically and experimentally, the effects of overconfidence and fake news on information aggregation and the quality of democratic choice in a common-interest setting. We theoretically show that overconfidence exacerbates the adverse effects of widespread misinformation (i.e., fake news). We then analyze richer models that allow for partisanship, targeted misinformation intended to sway public opinion, and news signals correlated across voters (due to media ownership concentration or censorship). In our experiment, overconfidence severely undermines information aggregation, suggesting that the effect of overconfidence can be much more pronounced at the collective than at the individual level.