Compulsory Versus Voluntary Insurance: An Online Experiment
通过在线实验比较强制、自愿和混合三种农业保险在逆向选择和道德风险上的差异，发现纯自愿保险存在逆向选择，混合保险存在有利选择，且混合保险的道德风险最小。
Agricultural insurance can be classified into two broad categories: Compulsory (government/public) and Voluntary (market/private) insurance. In practice, the vast majority of compulsory insurance is partially compulsory, where compulsory insurance provides only partial coverage, and it allows for supplemental voluntary purchases (mixed insurance). In this article, we use the Balloon Analogue Risk Task as the assessment of risk‐taking and insurance context to conduct an online experiment. The main objective is to compare compulsory, voluntary and mixed insurance in terms of adverse selection and moral hazard. We find adverse selection in purely voluntary insurance, but advantageous selection in mixed insurance. Moral hazard exists in all three types of insurance, but it is smaller in mixed insurance. Our ancillary results suggest that under the combined effects of significant moral hazard and “no adverse selection” in purely compulsory insurance make it the insurance type with the lowest social earnings. Overall there is no crowding‐out effect of the compulsory part on residual voluntary purchases in mixed insurance.