Responsible Sourcing under Asymmetric Information: Price Signaling versus Supplier Disclosure
研究了企业如何通过价格信号或供应商披露向消费者传达其负责任采购决策，发现单独使用价格信号可能导致企业选择不负责任的供应商，而低成本披露和高比例社会意识消费者能促进负责任采购。
ABSTRACT Given the growth in socially conscious consumption, firms are increasingly concerned with sourcing from responsible suppliers. However, a firm's sourcing decisions are not always apparent to consumers. Therefore, we investigate two mechanisms, signaling and disclosure, which a firm can use to communicate its sourcing decisions to consumers in a setting where only some consumers care about the firm's sourcing practices. We develop a supplier selection model with an embedded game in which the firm signals its supplier choice through price. Then, motivated by the observation that some firms have begun to disclose their supplier information, we consider a model in which the firm may voluntarily disclose information, but at a cost. We find that, under signaling alone, a firm which sources from a more responsible supplier may distort its price upward to signal its responsible sourcing. This leads to reduced profit, implying that the firm may have an incentive to source from a less responsible supplier. However, if supplier disclosure is an option, the firm will choose to source responsibly if the disclosure cost is small and the proportion of socially conscious consumers is large. Our findings highlight the importance of transparency and socially conscious consumption in driving responsible sourcing.