Robust Mechanism Design of Exchange
针对私有信息和相互依赖价值的交换经济，提出一种无需先验知识、无对称性假设的机制，通过歧视性条件双拍卖实现事后个体理性、激励相容、预算盈余和近似效率，并证明该机制在约束下效率损失最小。
Abstract In this article, we provide mechanisms for exchange economies with private information and interdependent values, which are ex post individually rational, incentive compatible, generate budget surplus, and are ex post nearly efficient, with many agents. Our framework is entirely prior-free, and we make no symmetry restrictions. The mechanisms can be implemented using a novel discriminatory conditional double auction, without knowledge of information structure or utility functions. We also show that no other mechanism satisfying the constraints can generate inefficiency of smaller order.