Self-enforcing Agreements and Forward Induction Reasoning
研究在动态博弈中，玩家观察到偏离事前非约束性协议后，如何通过前向归纳推理修正信念，并分析这种理性化过程对协议自我执行性的影响，发现传统均衡精炼的结论可能被颠覆。
Abstract In dynamic games, players may observe a deviation from a pre-play, possibly incomplete, non-binding agreement before the game is over. The attempt to rationalize the deviation may lead players to revise their beliefs about the deviator’s behaviour in the continuation of the game. This instance of forward induction reasoning is based on interactive beliefs about not just rationality, but also the compliance with the agreement itself. I study the effects of such rationalization on the self-enforceability of the agreement. Accordingly, outcomes of the game are deemed implementable by some agreement or not. Conclusions depart substantially from what the traditional equilibrium refinements suggest. A non-subgame perfect equilibrium outcome may be induced by a self-enforcing agreement, while a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome may not. The incompleteness of the agreement can be crucial to implement an outcome.