Protection Without Discrimination
证明非关税措施可能完全遵守WTO的非歧视原则，但仍起到保护主义作用，通过提高所有企业成本导致低效企业退出、市场份额向高效企业集中，并分析了该机制在政治经济动机下如何影响贸易协定与福利。
Abstract This paper shows that non-tariff measures may fully respect the non-discrimination principle of the World Trade Organisation and still act as a protectionist device. Non-tariff measures that raise costs of all firms induce some exit, reallocating market shares towards the most efficient firms. The paper analyses when this mechanism generates protectionism. With political economy motives, trade liberalisation increases the use of non-tariff measures in the non-cooperative equilibrium and a trade agreement may be welfare reducing if governments care about the most efficient firms only. Moreover, a Pareto improving agreement may require an income redistribution between countries if firm average productivity differs across countries.