Fiscal Incentives for Conflict: Evidence from India's Red Corridor
研究了印度对铁矿石征收10%从价税后，受影响邦的矿产使用费收入增长10倍，导致铁矿石丰富地区暴力冲突显著加剧，同时非法采矿活动增加。
Abstract Can tax regimes shape the incentives to engage in armed conflict? Indian mining royalties benefit the states but are set by the central government. India's Maoist belt is mineral rich, and states are responsible for counterinsurgency operations. We exploit the introduction of a 10% ad valorem tax on iron ore that increased royalty collections of the affected states by a factor of 10. We find that the royalty hike was followed by a significant intensification of violence in districts with important iron ore deposits. The royalty increase was also followed by an increase in illegal mining activity in iron mines.