An investigation of corporate directors' responses to CEO pay ratio disclosures and say‐on‐pay votes
通过在线实验研究CEO薪酬比率披露和薪酬话语权投票如何影响董事对CEO薪酬公平性的担忧及薪酬决策，发现高薪酬比率会抑制董事加薪意愿，而股东投票仅在薪酬比率高于行业均值时起作用。
Abstract The purpose of this study is to shed light on the effects of the CEO pay ratio and say‐on‐pay votes on directors' concerns about CEO pay equity. Investigation of the pay ratio disclosure rule offers opportunities to gain insights into whether equity perceptions associated with mandated pay ratio disclosure have significant effects on remuneration decisions in organizations. We conduct an online experiment with practicing corporate directors to examine the effects of CEO pay ratio disclosures and say‐on‐pay (SOP) votes on director decisions. Results indicate that CEO pay ratio disclosures significantly influence directors' decisions regarding executive compensation, leading directors to be less willing to increase CEO pay when the pay ratio is above the industry average pay ratio. Results also demonstrate that say‐on‐pay votes only influence directors' compensation decisions when the CEO pay ratio is above the industry average. Directors in firms with pay ratios that are above the industry average are less willing to increase CEO pay when they anticipate shareholder votes against a CEO pay increase than when they anticipate positive SOP voting outcomes. Directors in firms with CEO pay ratios that are below the industry average, however, are willing to increase CEO pay regardless of SOP voting outcomes.