Estimation in English auctions with unobserved heterogeneity
提出一个框架，利用竞拍人数变化识别和估计英式拍卖中带有未观测异质性的私人价值模型，并推广到竞拍人数不完全可观测的情形。基于eBay Motors数据发现未观测异质性解释了三分之二的价格变异，忽略它会严重扭曲福利估计。
Abstract We propose a framework for identification and estimation of a private values model with unobserved heterogeneity from bid data in English auctions, using variation in the number of bidders across auctions, and extend the framework to settings where the number of bidders is not cleanly observed in each auction. We illustrate our method on data from eBay Motors auctions. We find that unobserved heterogeneity is important, accounting for two thirds of price variation after controlling for observables, and that welfare measures would be dramatically misestimated if unobserved heterogeneity were ignored.