公告者的坏消息,竞争对手的好消息:竞争对手是否充分利用了公告者高层管理人员更替后的过渡期机会?

Bad news for announcers, good news for rivals: Are rivals fully seizing transition‐period opportunities following announcers' top management turnovers?

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL · 2020
被引 27
人大 AFT50UTD24ABS 4*

中文导读

研究CEO更替如何影响公告公司及其行业竞争对手,发现竞争对手能利用过渡期获得竞争优势,表现为正向股票回报和会计绩效,强制更替时效果更显著。

Abstract

Abstract Research summary This study analyzes whether and how the disruption of top management turnovers can affect not only turnover firms but also their intra‐industry rivals. It thus adds to the literature on both leader life cycles and competitive dynamics. Using a U.S. sample of 857 CEO turnovers, we find a period of relative stagnation for announcing companies following top management turnovers. We also find that intra‐industry rivals can use this period to their advantage. Semi‐structured interviews with seasoned CEOs, CFOs, and a board member from large publicly listed firms, as well as an extensive news search, support this notion. Intra‐industry rivals gain a competitive advantage that can result in positive abnormal stock returns and accounting performance. The intra‐industry outperformance is greater for forced turnovers. Managerial summary The departure of a company's CEO, forced or not, is usually a disruptive event for a company, as the successor must adapt to the new environment before undertaking any major strategic changes. Rivals can seize an opportunity during the transition period of the announcing company because they remain fully operational. They can thus actively exploit the relative inability of turnover companies to react by, for example, launching sales initiatives or increasing M&A activity. This interpretation is supported by internal and external evidence. Investors on average also recognize this situation, and stock prices react accordingly.

战略管理竞争动态高层管理更替企业绩效