Industry tournament incentives and audit fees
研究发现CEO的行业锦标赛激励（以同行业CEO薪酬差距衡量）会降低审计费用，且在高流动性和高管理能力的公司中更显著，并通过FAS 123R实施前后的双重差分分析验证了因果关系。
Abstract I examine whether industry tournament incentives of CEOs are associated with audit fees. I find that industry tournament incentives, measured by the compensation gap between a CEO under consideration and the second‐highest‐paid CEO among similar industries, reduce audit fees. Also, this effect is more pronounced for firms with a high level of mobility and managerial ability. To establish causality, I employ a difference‐in‐differences approach to compare the change in audit fees before and after the implementation of FAS 123R. My finding holds after I account for potential endogeneity, different industry classifications, and CFO incentive effects.