Valuation Effects of Norway’s Board Gender-Quota Law Revisited
重新审视挪威董事会性别配额法的估值效应，指出早期研究在日期归因、统计显著性和宏观事件干扰上的问题，并提供新证据表明该配额对估值的统计影响不显著。
We highlight the complexities in estimating the valuation effects of board gender quotas by critically revisiting studies of Norway’s pioneering board gender-quota law. We use the short-run event study of Ahern and Dittmar [Ahern KR, Dittmar A (2012) The changing of the boards: The impact on firm valuation of mandated female board representation. Quart. J. Econom. 127(1):137–197] to illustrate (1) the difficulties in attributing quota-related news to specific dates, (2) the need to account for contemporaneous cross-correlation of stock returns when judging the statistical significance of event-related abnormal stock returns, and (3) the fundamental difficulty of separating quota-induced valuation effects from the influences of firm characteristics and macroeconomic events such as the financial crisis. We provide new evidence suggesting that the valuation effect of Norway’s quota law was statistically insignificant. Overall, our evidence suggests that, at the time of the Norwegian quota, the supply of qualified female director candidates was high enough to avoid the negative consequences of the quota highlighted previously in the literature. This paper was accepted by Renee Adams, finance.