On the core of auctions with externalities: stability and fairness
研究了具有外部性的拍卖中核心为空的问题，通过区分两种偏离行为，证明在竞拍者不能拒绝付款时核心非空，对高 stakes 拍卖的稳定性和公平性有启示。
Abstract In auctions with externalities, it is well‐known that the core can be empty, which is undesirable both in terms of stability and “fairness.” Nevertheless, some auction outcome must be chosen. We separate deviations into two types: deviations by paying more and deviations by refusing to pay . In high‐stakes auctions where bidders also care about their reputation, the latter are unlikely to occur, or else can be prevented by legal interventions. In contrast, the former is more undesirable in the sense that the seller and the bidders experience justified envy . We show that the core is nonempty if bidders cannot refuse to pay.