Job Matching under Constraints
研究了医院招聘医生时面临任意约束的情况，发现只有“广义区间约束”能保持替代条件，从而保证竞争均衡的良好性质。
Studying job matching in a Kelso-Crawford framework, we consider arbitrary constraints imposed on sets of doctors that a hospital can hire. We characterize all constraints that preserve the substitutes condition (for all revenue functions that satisfy the substitutes condition), a critical condition on hospitals’ revenue functions for well-behaved competitive equilibria. A constraint preserves the substitutes condition if and only if it is a “generalized interval constraint,” which specifies the minimum and maximum numbers of hired doctors, forces some hires, and forbids others. Additionally, “generalized polyhedral constraints” are precisely those that preserve the substitutes condition for all “group separable” revenue functions.