How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?
研究了绩效信号如何影响合同中的支付阈值，发现信号方向与阈值调整的关系并非直观，并应用于绩效归属期权设计，指出当前实践可能不当。
Abstract The informativeness principle states that a contract should depend on informative signals. This paper studies how it should do so. Signals indicating that the output distribution has shifted to the left (e.g., weak industry performance) reduce the threshold for the manager to be paid; those indicating that output is a precise measure of effort (e.g., low volatility) decrease high thresholds and increase low thresholds. Surprisingly, “good” signals of performance need not reduce the threshold. Applying our model to performance-based vesting, we show that performance measures should affect the strike price, rather than the number of vesting options, contrary to practice.