Sequential Auctions with Synergy and Affiliation across Auctions
对跨拍卖存在协同效应和关联性的序贯拍卖进行结构分析，提出一个灵活且易处理的模型，并建立非参数识别方法以区分协同效应和关联性，最后应用于油气租赁数据的反事实政策评估。
This paper performs a structural analysis of sequential auctions with both synergy and affiliation across auctions. I propose a flexible yet tractable sequential auction model under the private value paradigm and establish its nonparametric identification, demonstrating an intuitive and general method for disentangling synergy from affiliation. After developing an estimation procedure closely tied to the identification steps, I apply it to data on adjacent oil and gas leases that are auctioned sequentially. I assess the role played by affiliation versus synergy in the observed allocation patterns and evaluate the counterfactual policy of bundled auctions.