ENTREPRENEUR–INVESTOR INFORMATION DESIGN
研究了企业家在签约前生成项目质量信息时，其讨价还价能力如何影响信息生成效率，发现只有当企业家讨价还价能力足够高时才能实现有效信息生成，且项目成本高时投资者不愿拥有全部讨价还价能力。
Abstract I consider an environment in which an entrepreneur generates information about the quality of his project prior to contracting with an investor. The investor faces a moral‐hazard problem since the entrepreneur may divert the funding for private consumption. I find that the efficient amount of information is generated if and only if the bargaining power of the entrepreneur is high enough. I interpret this result in terms of investors' tightness, competitiveness, and generosity measures. I also show that the investor prefers not to have all the bargaining power when the project costs are high enough.