The Anticompetitive Effect of Minority Share Acquisitions: Evidence from the Introduction of National Leniency Programs
利用63个国家引入国家宽大计划作为冲击，研究发现该计划显著增加了国内横向少数股权收购，尤其在宽大计划有效的国家，表明企业可能利用少数股权收购来稳定合谋或缓和竞争。
We address the growing concern that minority shareholding (MS) in rival firms may lessen competition, using the introduction of national leniency programs (LPs) as a shock that destabilizes collusive agreements. Based on data from 63 countries, we find a large and significant immediate increase in domestic horizontal MS acquisitions once an LP is introduced but only in countries where the LP is deemed to be effective. There is no effect on non-horizontal or cross-border MS acquisitions. Our findings suggest that firms may use MS acquisitions to either stabilize collusive agreements or soften competition in the event that collusion breaks down.