Independent director tenure and dividends
研究发现独立董事任期越长，公司发放股利的可能性和水平越高，且更倾向于平滑股利，但这种关系仅存在于治理良好或自由现金流低的公司，支持了管理层友好假说。
Abstract We empirically test the Expertise vs. Management friendly hypotheses of independent director tenure through dividend policies. We find that the likelihood and the level of dividends increase with independent director tenure, and firms with long‐tenured directors are more likely to smooth dividends. This positive tenure–dividend relation is only evident in well‐governed and low‐free‐cash‐flow firms. The results suggest that managers use dividends as camouflage to divert public scrutiny from compromised monitoring of long‐tenured directors, but they are pushed to pre‐commit to dividends in well‐governed firms. We also document that investors value dividends with a premium in firms with long‐tenured directors, further corroborating the view that longer‐tenured directors are perceived as less effective monitors. The results are robust to various variable measures and model specifications, and support the Management friendly hypothesis .