Announcing High Prices to Deter Innovation
研究发现，企业通过媒体活动宣布高价能有效阻止竞争对手创新，因为高价增加了对手的短期利润，放大了其替代效应，从而降低其研发动力。
Price announcements—similar to the ones made by tech firms at media events—are effective in deterring innovation. By announcing (and setting) a high price, a firm increases its rivals’ short-run profits, reducing the rival firms’ incentives to innovate by magnifying their Arrow’s replacement effect. We show that the equilibrium prices are greater and research and development (R&D) investments lower relative to when price announcements cannot be used strategically. We call this the R&D deterrence effect of price and show that it induces equilibrium prices that may exceed the multiproduct monopoly prices and even dissipate the consumer benefits of innovation. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.