Network Centrality and Managerial Market-Timing Ability
研究发现股票回购和内部人买入公告后的长期超额收益与企业在投入产出贸易流网络中的中心性呈U型关系，揭示了投资者有限分析能力如何影响管理者的信息优势和市场择时能力。
Abstract We document that long-run excess returns following announcements of share buyback authorizations and insider purchases are a U-shaped function of firm centrality in the input–output trade-flow network. These results conform to a model of investors endowed with a large but finite capacity for analyzing firms. Additional links weaken insiders’ informational advantage in peripheral firms (simple firms whose cash flows depend on few economic links), provided investors’ capacity is large enough, but eventually amplify that advantage in central firms (firms with many links) as a result of investors’ limited capacity. These findings shed light on the sources of managerial market-timing ability.